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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the link between the optimal level of nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms’ leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. Using the model of ﬁrm’s
value maximization, we show that as macroeconomic uncertainty increases,
captured by an increase in the variability of industrial production or inﬂation,
ﬁrms decrease their optimal levels of borrowing. We test this prediction on a
panel of non–ﬁnancial US ﬁrms drawn from COMPUSTAT quarterly database
covering the period 1991-2001, and ﬁnd that as macroeconomic uncertainty
increases, ﬁrms decrease their levels of leverage. Our results are robust with
respect to the inclusion of macroeconomic factors such as interest rate, and
index of leading indicators.
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11 Introduction
“WASHINGTON, March 12 (Reuters) — Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (NYSE:NWL
— News), a household and business products maker, on Wednesday ﬁled with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (News – Websites) to periodically sell up to $1
billion in debt securities ... company said the net proceeds of the sale would be used
for general corporate purposes. These could include additions to working capital,
repayment of existing debt and acquisitions, according to the shelf registration ﬁling.
Under such a ﬁling, a company may sell securities from time to time in one or more
oﬀerings, with amounts, prices and terms determined at the time of sale.”1 As all
these changes in debt aﬀect the leverage level, it is interesting to investigate the
driving factors leading to this variation. For this purpose it is crucial to study the
indicators that inﬂuence the “underwriters” advice with respect to the best timing
for issuing debt. The importance of this research is further justiﬁed by the amount of
issued debt taking place nowadays. For example on March 12, 2003 Reuters informed
about twelve more diﬀerent debt issues, including Moore North America ($400 mln),
Citigroup ($1.5 bln), Bank of America ($295 mln), Shaw Group ($253 mln), Comcast
($1.5 bln), Eli Lilly ($500 mln), Hanson Australia Funding ($600 mln), Unisys Corp
($300 mln).2
The most common purposes for borrowing are capital investment and existing
debt repayment. However, some corporations change the amount of debt they issue
just before the oﬃcial announcement. For instance, both Citigroup and Comcast
originally planned to sell $1.0 billion notes each. It is important to understand why
ﬁrms change their decisions about initial oﬀerings.
Determinants of capital structure always attracted a lot of research attention.
1Citation: Yahoo! Bond Center: Latest Bond Market News, 12 March 2003,
http://biz.yahoo.com/n/z/z0400.html?htime=1047576818
2Ibid.
2In the middle of the last century, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that under
perfect capital market assumption ﬁnancial and real variables are irrelevant. How-
ever, recent theoretical developments are opposite to this fact. For instance, there
is wide literature on the relationship between liquid asset holdings and ﬁrms’ invest-
ment decisions.3. Furthermore, leverage depends on such ﬁrm–speciﬁc characteris-
tics as cash–holdings, total assets, and investment–to–capital ratio4 Unfortunately,
little work has been done on estimating the interaction of macroeconomic level vari-
ables and capital structure indicators. Baum et al. (2001) ﬁnd relationship between
macroeconomic uncertainty and cross–sectional distribution of cash–to–asset ratios
for US non–ﬁnancial ﬁrms. One may conclude that macroeconomic uncertainty is
an important factor of macroeconomic environment. Following this idea, we want to
contribute to the literature on corporate debt by investigation of the link between
macroeconomic uncertainty and optimal level of leverage.5
In this paper, we show that ﬁrms may alter their debt level in presence of macroe-
conomic uncertainty. In order to achieve this goal a dynamic stochastic partial equi-
librium model of the ﬁrm’s value optimization is developed. The model is based upon
a testable hypothesis of association between optimal level of debt and uncertainty.
According to the theoretical predictions, an increase in money growth uncertainty or
inﬂation uncertainty leads to a decrease in leverage. In times of greater macroeco-
nomic uncertainty companies issue less debt.
To ascertain the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the optimal level of
leverage we utilize a panel of non–ﬁnancial ﬁrms obtained from the quarterly COM-
PUSTAT database over 1991–2001 period. After some screening procedures it in-
cludes above 30,000 manufacturing ﬁrm–year observations, with 700 ﬁrms per quar-
3See Gilchrist and Himmelbert (1998); Fazzari et al. (1988), for example
4See Shuetrim et al. (1993), Auerbach (1983), Weill (2001).
5One may suggest to investigate the eﬀect of idiosyncratic uncertainty as a factor aﬀecting lever-
age. The investigation of this eﬀect is beyond the scope of the paper.
3ter. We also consider a sample split, deﬁning categories of durable–goods makers vs.
non–durable goods makers. Our empirical strategy links the level of leverage and
the macroeconomic uncertainty proxies using Arellano–Bond dynamic panel data ap-
proach (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows. The data provide evidence for a neg-
ative association between the optimal level of debt and macroeconomic uncertainty,
proxied by conditional variance of money growth and by conditional variance of inﬂa-
tion. Moreover, leverage levels of durable-goods makers are more sensitive to changes
in monetary policy than those of non-durable goods makers. The result are shown
to be robust to inclusion of such macroeconomic level variables as index of leading
indicators and interest rate.
These results provide information for corporate structure decisions. Changes in
macroeconomic uncertainty, partially caused by monetary policy, aﬀect leverage, costs
of obtaining external ﬁnance and investment dynamics thereafter. Moreover, mone-
tary policy has an eﬀect on discount rate of investment project. Therefore, the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy is much more complicated than described in
the models ignoring interaction of real, ﬁnance and uncertainty variables.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
ﬁrm’s value maximization model. Section 3 describes the data and discuss our results.
Finally, Section 4 concludes and gives suggestions for further research.
2 A Q Model of Investment
2.1 Model Setup
The main theoretical model proposed in this paper is focused on the ﬁrm value op-
timization problem and represents a generalization of the standard Q models of in-
vestment by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Love (2003), Hubbard and Kashyap
4(1992). The present value of the ﬁrm is set equal to the expected discounted stream











Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, (2)
Dt = Π(Kt,ξt) − C(It,Kt) − It + Bt+1 − (1 + rt)(1 + η(Bt,Kt,ξt))Bt, (3)








BT = 0,∀t (5)
The ﬁrm maximizes equation (1) subject to three constraints. The ﬁrst is capital
stock accounting identity Kt+1 = (1−δ)Kt +It, where Kt is beginning-of-the-period
capital stock, It is the investment expenditures, and δ is the rate of capital deprecia-
tion. The second constraint deﬁnes ﬁrm dividends. Π(Kt,ξt) denotes the maximized
value of current proﬁts taking as giving the beginning-of the-period capital stock, and
a proﬁtability shock ξt. C(It,Kt) is real cost of adjusting It units of capital. We incor-
porate ﬁnancial frictions assuming that risk-neutral share-holders require an external
premium, η(Bt,Kt,ξt), which depends on such ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics as debt and
capital stock. As Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), we also assume ∂η/∂Bt > 0 that
highly indebted ﬁrms have to pay additional premium to compensate debt-holders for
additional costs because of monitoring or hazard problems. Moreover, ∂η/∂Kt < 0
that large ﬁrms have to pay lower risk premium. The gross interest rate is equal to
(1 + rt)(1 + η(Bt,Kt,ξt)), where rt is the risk-free rate of return. Finally, Bt denotes
ﬁnancial liabilities of the ﬁrm.
Financial frictions are also introduced through non–negativity constraint for div-
idends, Dt ≥ 0 and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λt. The λt can be in-
terpreted as the shadow cost of internally generated funds. The last equation is
5transversality condition, which prevents the ﬁrm from borrowing an inﬁnite amount
and paying it out as dividends.
Solving the optimization problem we derive Euler equation for investment:
∂Ct
∂It


















Expression βΘt may serve as a stochastic time-varying discount factor which is equal
to β if we do not have ﬁnancial constraints (λt+1 = λt). Equation (6) relates optimal
level of debt, Bt+1, with marginal proﬁt of capital, ∂Π(Kt+1,ξt+1)/∂Kt+1, marginal
adjustment cost of investment, ∂C(It,Kt)/∂It, expected marginal adjustment cost in
period t + 1, ∂C(It+1,Kt+1)/∂It+1, and relative shadow cost of external ﬁnancing in
periods t and t + 1, Θt =
(1+λt+1)
(1+λt) .











In the steady state β(1 + rt+1)Θt = β(1 + rt+1) = 1, which implies that ηt+1 +
∂ηt+1
∂Bt+1Bt+1 = 0. Since we assume
∂ηt+1
∂Bt+1 > 0, then Bt is guaranteed to be positive only
if ηt+1 < 0. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) suggest that the risk premium may be
negative if η is considered as net of tax advantages or agency beneﬁts.
Our parametrization approach follows roughly Love (2003) and Gilchrist and Him-
melberg (1998). The level of ﬁnancing constraint for a representative ﬁrm i, Θit, is a
function of cash stock and debt









TAit is cash–to–total assets ratio,
Bit
TAit is debt level and a0i is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
degree of ﬁnancial constraints. Debt generates interest and principle obligations and
6increases probability of ﬁnancial distress while availability of liquid assets decrease
external ﬁnance constraint (see Hubbard et al., 1995; Almeida et al., 2003).







Parameter νi might be interpreted as a ﬁrm-speciﬁc optimal level of investment. Then









In order to introduce macroeconomic uncertainty into the model, we parameter-
























Kt+1, where εt+1 is a macroeconomic shock in-
dependent of
It+1



































where S is the ﬁrm’s sales, K is capital and θ =
αk
µ , αk is the capital share
in the Cobb–Douglas production function speciﬁcation and µ is markup (deﬁned as
1/(1+κ−1), where κ is the ﬁrm–level price elasticity of demand).
Finally, we linearize the product of βt, Θt and At, where At =
∂Πt+1






− (1 + rt+1)
∂ηt+1
∂Kt+1Bt+1. We utilize ﬁrst order Taylor approximation
around means. Ignoring constant terms the approximation is equal to
6There is a discussion in Gilchrist and Himmelber (1998) suggesting that sales-based measure of
marginal proﬁt of capital is more desirable comparing to operating income measure.
7βtΘtAt = βγΘt + βAt + γβt (12)
where β is the average discount factor, γ denotes the unconditional mean of At.
We assume rational expectations, that allows to replace expectations with realized
values plus ﬁrm-speciﬁc error term, et, orthogonal to information set available at the
time when optimal investment and borrowing are chosen.7
Bit+1
Kit+1
















+ β6τt−1 + fi + di + eit

























< 0, fi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect which is a function
of a0i and νi.9 Moreover, we control for industry speciﬁc eﬀect using industry dummies
di,t.
Since COMPUSTAT gives end–of–period values for ﬁrms, we include lagged prox-
ies for uncertainty in the regressions instead of contemporaneous proxies.10 Thus,
7In order to reduce the potential eﬀect of heteroscedasticity we scale debt and cash by the level
of capital.
8We assume that in steady state β(1 + rt+1) = 1.
9Firm–speciﬁc eﬀect is equal to fi =
 
1 − β(1 − δ)

ανi + βγa0i.
10In our analysis we employ also lagged values of three-month Treasury Bill rate and detrended
index of leading indicators as control variables.
8we can say that recently–experienced volatility will aﬀect ﬁrms’ behavior. The main
hypothesis of our paper is:
H0 : β6 < 0 (14)
That is, macroeconomic uncertainty aﬀects optimal level and this eﬀect is negative.
When ﬁrms anticipate “bad times” then they issue less debt.
Our model speciﬁcation anticipates β3 < 0, and β4 < 0. Current optimal leverage
level increases in response to decrease in liquid assets or sales. Moreover, we anticipate
to receive persistence of leverage ratio, β2 > 0.
2.2 Identifying Macroeconomic Uncertainty
The macroeconomic uncertainty identiﬁcation approach resembles the one used by
Baum et al. (2002). Firms’ debt depends on anticipation of future proﬁts and in-
vestments. The diﬃculty of the optimal amount of debt issuing evaluation increases
with the level of macroeconomic uncertainty. In this paper we use two proxies for
macroeconomic uncertainty. First, the conditional variance of money growth, which
is a measure of from monetary policy makers side. This indicator is available at a
higher (monthly) frequency than the one of the national income aggregates. Second,
in order to capture the uncertainty emerging from the ﬁnancial sector, we use the
conditional variance of the CPI inﬂation. However, we use not lagged but weighted
conditional variances of money growth (WCV MON) or inﬂation (WCV INFL),





tively. Introduction of arithmetic lags proxies allows to capture the combined eﬀects
of contemporaneous and lagged levels of uncertainty.
We derive our proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty from monthly real monetary
base (DRI series FMBASE) and from consumer price inﬂation (International Finan-
cial Statistics series 64XZF). For each of these cases we build a generalized ARCH
9(GARCH) model for the series, where the mean equation is an autoregression. The
conditional variances derived from this GARCH model for each proxy are averaged
to the quarterly frequency and then used.
Literature suggests also other candidates for macroeconomic uncertainty proxies
such as moving standard deviation (see Ghosal and Loungani, 2000), standard devi-
ation across 12 forecasting teams of the output growth and inﬂation rate in the next
12 month (see Driver and Moreton, 1991). However, pattern of our macroeconomic
data suggests us to use GARCH (1,1) model.11
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Dataset
We work with the COMPUSTAT Quarterly database of U.S. ﬁrms. The initial
databases include 173,505 ﬁrms’ quarterly characteristics over 1991-2001. The ﬁrms
are classiﬁed by two–digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC). The main advan-
tage of the dataset is that it contains detailed balance sheet information. However,
the main limitation of the data is the signiﬁcant weight on large companies.
We also apply a number of sample selection criteria to the original sample. First,
we set all negative values for all variables in the sample as missing. Second, we set
observations as missing if the values of ratio variables are lower than 1st percentile or
higher than 99th percentile. We prefer to use the screened data to reduce the potential
impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates. After the screening and using only
manufacturing sector ﬁrms we receive on average 700 ﬁrms’ quarterly characteristics.
In order to construct ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables we utilize COMPUSTAT data items
Long-term debt (data9) and Total Assets (data6) for leverage ratio, Cash and Short–
Term Investments (data1), Capital Expenditures (data90), Sales (data12) for Cash–
11This approach is also used by Driver and Urga (2002), Byrne and Davis (2002).
10to–Asset ratio (Cash/TA), Investment–to-Asset ratio (I/K) and Sales–to-Asset ratio
(S/K).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for ﬁrm speciﬁc variables. The median long-
term debt as a percentage of total assets is 19% compared to the mean of 21%.
We subdivide the data of manufacturing–sector ﬁrms (two–digit SIC 20–39) into
producers of durable goods and producers of non–durable goods on the basis of SIC
ﬁrms’ codes. A ﬁrm is considered DURABLE if its primary SIC is 24, 25, 32–39.12
SIC classiﬁcations for NON–DURABLE industries are 20–23 or 26–31.13 Besides the
macroeconomic variables described in the previous subsection, we also use the rate
of CPI inﬂation, three–month Treasury Bill rate and the detrended index of leading
indicators as control variables.14
3.2 Empirical results
This paper focuses on the link between the leverage level of the ﬁrm and both ﬁrm–
speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables. Based on the dynamic stochastic partial equi-
librium model, we hypothesize that non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms decrease the level of uncer-
tainty increases.
The results of estimating Equation (13) are given in Tables 2–4 for all manufactur-
ing ﬁrms, durable–goods makers and non–durable goods makers. Column (1) of Table
2 represents the Arellano–Bond one–step estimator with weighted conditional vari-
ance of inﬂation as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. Columns (2)–(3) include
estimates controlling for the eﬀects of three–month Treasury Bill rate (Interestt−1),
12These industries include lumber and wood products, furniture, stone, clay, and glass products,
primary and fabricated metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, transportation
equipment, instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
13These industries include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publish-
ing, chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastics, and leather products makers.
14Detrended index of leading indicators is computed from DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics
series DLEAD.
11and index of leading indicators (Leadingt−1). The model is estimated using an or-
thogonal transformation instrumented by all available moment restrictions starting
from (t − 2).15 Columns (4)–(5) include results with weighted conditional variance
of money growth as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. All regressions include
constant and industry dummies. Moreover, robust standard errors were used. On the
basis of Sargan test we cannot say that the models are misspeciﬁed.
The results indicate that there is a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between
leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. The coeﬃcient by uncertainty variable takes
values from -0.013 to -0.016 for inﬂation proxy and -0.058 for money growth proxy
respectively.
We receive interesting contrast for durable good makers and non–durable goods
makers in Tables 3 and 4. Durable goods makers exhibit negative signiﬁcant ef-
fects when macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied by weighted conditional variance of
money growth, with larger in absolute value coeﬃcients than those for all ﬁrms. As
these companies have larger inventories of work in progress and have longer produc-
tion cycle they are more sensitive to volatility in monetary policy, including money
growth. At the same time, they are marginally aﬀected by uncertainty from inﬂation
side, while non–durable goods makers mostly aﬀected by this type of uncertainty only.
In summary, we ﬁnd support for model predictions expressed in expression (15).
The ﬁrms decrease their borrowing in more uncertain times. The results vary be-
tween durable good makers and non–durable manufacturers. When macroeconomic
environment becomes more uncertain companies become more cautious and borrow
less. This conclusion corresponds to results described in Bloom et al., 2001.








T − t + 1
1/2
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values.
124 Conclusions
In the paper we investigate the relationship between leverage of manufacturing ﬁrms
and macroeconomic uncertainty using Quarterly COMPUSTAT data. Based on the
theoretical predictions developed using famous Q-model of investment, we anticipate
that ﬁrms decrease the level of debt when macroeconomic uncertainty increases. In
order to test empirically our model we employ dynamic panel data methodology.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in results for durable good makers and non–
durable goods manufacturers. The former exhibit larger sensitivity to macroeconomic
uncertainty from monetary policy makers side, while the latter reacted to changes in
inﬂation volatility.
Results are shown to be robust to inclusion of such macroeconomic level variables
as interest rate, and index of leading indicators.
From the policy perspective, we suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty has an
eﬀect on balance sheet structure, which aﬀects the dynamics of investment. Recent
studies (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) show that balance sheets shocks may aﬀect
the amplitude of investment cycle in a simple neoclasical model. Moreover, in many
countries monetary policy tends to be characterized by runs of successive monetary
instruments movements in the same direction, with only rare reversals during which
the monetary instrument moves in the opposite direction to recent changes. For
instance the Federal Reserve is particularly averse to interest rate reversals. In the
US, it is approximately ten times more likely that a rise in the interest rate will be
followed by another rise, rather than a fall, in the interest rate. One may suggest to
rationalize the lack of reversals in central bank policy.
13References
[1] Almeida H., M. Campello and M.S. Weisbach, 2003, “The Cash Flow Sensitivity
of Cash”, Journal of Finance, August 2004 forthcoming.
[2] Arellano, M. and S. Bond, 1991, “Some Tests of Speciﬁcation for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” The Re-
view of Economic Studies 58: 277-297.
[3] Auerbach Alan J., 1983, “Real Determinants of Corporate Leverage”, NBER
Working paper No.1151.
[4] Baum, Ch. F., M. Caglayan, N. Ozkun and O. Talavera, 2002, “The Impact of
Macroeconomic Unicertainty of Cash Holdings for Non–Financial Firms,” Boston
College Working paper No.552.
[5] Bernanke, B. S. and Gertler M., 1989, “Agency costs, net worth and business
ﬂuctuations”, American Economic Review, vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 14-31.
[6] Bloom N., S. Bond and J.V. Reenen., “The Dynamics of Investment under Un-
certainty”, Institute for Fiscal Studies Working paper No. WP01/5.
[7] Bond S., D. Harhoﬀ and J.V. Reenen, 1999, “Investment, R&D and Financial
Constraints in Britain and Germany,” Institute for Fiscal Studies Working paper
No. WP99/5.
[8] Byrne J. and E. Davis, 2002, “Investment and Uncertainty in the G7”, National
Institute of Economic Research, London, Discussion Paper.
[9] Davenport M., 1971, “Leverage and the Cost of Capital: Some Tests Using
British Data,” Economica, vol. 38, no. 150, pp. 136–162.
14[10] Driver, C. and D. Moreton, 1991, “The Inﬂuence of Uncertainty on Aggregate
Spending,” Economic Journal, 101, pp. 1452–59.
[11] Fazzari, S., G. Hubbard and B. Petersen, 1988, “Financing Constraints and
Corporate Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 78 (2), pp.
141-95.
[12] Gilchrist S. and C. Himmelberg (1998),“Investment, Fundamentals and Fi-
nance,” NBER Macro Annual.
[13] Ghosal, V. and P. Loungani (2000), “The Diﬀerential Impact of Uncertainty
on Investment in Small and Large Business,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics,” 82, pp. 338–349.
[14] Hubbard, R.G., 1998, “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 36 (3).
[15] Hubbard, R.G. and A. Kashyap, 1992, “Internal Net Worth and the Invest-
ment Process: An Application to US Agriculture,” Journal of Political Economy,
v.100(3).
[16] Hubbard, R.G., A. Kashyap, and T. Whited, 1995, “Internal Finance and Firm
Investment,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 27 (4) pp. 683-701.
[17] Jaramillo, F., F. Schiantarelli, and A. Weiss, 1996, “Capital Market Imperfec-
tions Before and After Financial Liberalization: An Euler Equation Approach
to Panel Data for Ecuadorian Firms,” Journal of Development Economics, vol.
51(2), pp. 367–86.
15[18] Love, Inessa, 2003, “Financial Development and Financing Constraints: Inter-
national Evidence from the Structural Investment Model,” Review of FInancial
Studies, 16: 765–791.
[19] Mills K., S. Morling and W. Tease, 1995, “The Inﬂuence of Financial Factors on
Corporate Investment,” Australian Economic Review.
[20] Modigliani, F. and M. Miller, 1958, “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance,
and the Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review, 48 (3), pp. 261-97.
[21] Shuetrim, Geoﬀrey, Philip Lowe and Steve Morling, 1993, “The Determinants of
Corporate Leverage: a Panel Data Analysis,” Research Discussion Paper 9313,
Reserve Bank of Australia.
[22] Weill Laurent, 2001, “Leverage and Corporate Performance: A Frontier Eﬃ-
ciency Analysis”, mimeo. Institut d’Etudes Politiques.
16Appendix 1: Construction of leverage, macroeconomic and ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc measures
The following variables are used in the quarterly empirical study.
From the COMPUSTAT database:





From International Financial Statistics:
64XZF: consumer price inﬂation
From the DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics database:
DLEAD: index of leading indicators
FMBASE: real monetary base
17Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All ﬁrms µ σ2 p25 p50 p75
Bt
TAt 0.2140 0.0258 0.0872 0.1896 0.3083
It
TAt 0.0372 0.0357 0.0131 0.0269 0.0495
Casht
TAt 0.0747 0.0097 0.0117 0.0329 0.0969
St
TAt 0.3064 0.0211 0.2117 0.2832 0.3721
Durable
Bt
TAt 0.2047 0.0252 0.0792 0.1771 0.2969
It
TAt 0.0360 0.0355 0.0126 0.0258 0.0472
Casht
TAt 0.0797 0.0102 0.0136 0.0376 0.1054
St
TAt 0.0205 0.0211 0.2177 0.2881 0.3734
Non–Durable
Bt
TAt 0.2268 0.0264 0.1017 0.2059 0.3215
It
TAt 0.0387 0.0359 0.0139 0.0285 0.0524
Casht
TAt 0.0676 0.0090 0.0098 0.0275 0.0873
St
TAt 0.2995 0.0217 0.2023 0.2763 0.3693
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while σ2 and µ represent its
variance and mean respectively.
18Table 2: Determinants of Leverage: All Firms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WCV INFLt−1 -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗
[0.0050] [0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0053]
WCV MONt−1 -0.0584∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗
[0.0168] [0.0175]
B
K t−1 0.8338∗∗∗ 0.8347∗∗∗ 0.8328∗∗∗ 0.8311∗∗∗ 0.8344∗∗∗
[0.0159] [0.0159] [0.0162] [0.0162] [0.0159]
CASH
K t -0.0726∗∗∗ -0.0723∗∗∗ -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.0734∗∗∗ -0.0727∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0100] [0.0100] [0.0101] [0.0100]
S
K t -0.0863∗∗∗ -0.0864∗∗∗ -0.0857∗∗∗ -0.0856∗∗∗ -0.0860∗∗∗
[0.0089] [0.0089] [0.0089] [0.0089] [0.0088]
I
K t -0.0278∗ -0.0280∗ -0.0261 -0.0274∗ -0.0288∗
[0.0163] [0.0163] [0.0162] [0.0162] [0.0163]
I
K t+1 -0.0241∗ -0.0246∗ -0.0246∗ -0.0184 -0.0205





LM (1) -13.38∗∗∗ -13.39∗∗∗ -13.40∗∗∗ -13.40∗∗∗ -13.39∗∗∗
LM (2) 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.70 0.72
Sargan (p) 0.464 0.445 0.489 0.398 0.423
Note: Sample size is 24106 observations. Every equation includes constant and industry dummy
variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM
using DPD package for GiveWin, one–step results. “Sargan” is a Sargan–Hansen test of overidenti-
fying restrictions (p–value reported). “LM (k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments
are B/Kt−2 to B/Kt−6, CASH/Kt−2 to CASH/Kt−6, I/Kt−2 to I/Kt−6, and S/Kt−2 to S/Kt−6.
19Table 3: Determinants of Leverage: Durable Goods–Makers
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WCV INFLt−1 -0.0112∗ -0.0117∗ -0.0092
[0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0069]
WCV MONt−1 -0.0708∗∗∗ -0.0765∗∗∗ -0.0613∗∗∗
[0.0215] [0.0216] [0.0226]
B
K t−1 0.8129∗∗∗ 0.8108∗∗∗ 0.8189∗∗∗ 0.8164∗∗∗ 0.8211∗∗∗
[0.0227] [0.0231] [0.0216] [0.0221] [0.0216]
CASH
K t -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.0776∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗ -0.0770∗∗∗
[0.0141] [0.0142] [0.0140] [0.0141] [0.0140]
S
K t -0.1061∗∗∗ -0.1051∗∗∗ -0.1056∗∗∗ -0.1046∗∗∗ -0.1053∗∗∗
[0.0126] [0.0126] [0.0126] [0.0126] [0.0126]
I
K t -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.0630∗∗∗ -0.0680∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.0674∗∗∗
[0.0233] [0.0232] [0.0244] [0.0242] [0.0244]
I
K t+1 -0.0269∗∗ -0.0377∗∗ -0.0246∗ -0.0277 -0.0286
[0.0187] [0.0188] [0.0191] [0.0191] [0.0192]
LEADINGt−1 0.0006∗ 0.0006∗
[0.0003] [0.0003]
LM (1) -9.783∗∗ -9.795∗∗ -9.85∗∗ -9.86∗∗ -9.86∗∗∗
LM (2) 0.50 0.50 0.78 0.78 0.79
Sargan (p) 0.345 0.347 0.278 0.284 0.317
Note: Sample size is 14176 observations. Every equation includes constant and industry dummy
variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM
using DPD package for GiveWin, one–step results. “Sargan” is a Sargan–Hansen test of overidenti-
fying restrictions (p–value reported). “LM (k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments
are B/Kt−2 to B/Kt−4, CASH/Kt−2 to CASH/Kt−4, I/Kt−2 to I/Kt−4, and S/Kt−2 to S/Kt−4.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WCV INFLt−1 -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗
[0.0078] [0.0077] [0.0082]
WCV MONt−1 -0.0253 -0.0281 -0.0027
[0.0261] [0.0262] [0.0226]
B
K t−1 0.8730∗∗∗ 0.8729∗∗∗ 0.8718∗∗∗ 0.8718∗∗∗ 0.8729∗∗∗
[0.0207] [0.0208] [0.0207] [0.0208] [0.0206]
CASH
K t -0.0659∗∗∗ -0.0657∗∗∗ -0.0679∗∗∗ -0.0675∗∗∗ -0.0659∗∗∗
[0.0130] [0.0130] [0.0129] [0.0129] [0.0129]
S
K t -0.0620∗∗∗ -0.0617∗∗∗ -0.0630∗∗∗ -0.0625∗∗∗ -0.0620∗∗∗
[0.0112] [0.0112] [0.0112] [0.0113] [0.0112]
I
K t 0.0268 0.0281 0.0248 0.0266 0.0267
[0.0187] [0.0188] [0.0186] [0.0187] [0.0187]
I
K t+1 -0.0087 -0.0090 -0.0048 -0.0050 -0.0085
[0.0192] [0.0193] [0.0191] [0.0193] [0.0195]
LEADINGt−1 0.0002 0.0003
[0.0003] [0.0003]
LM (1) -10.51∗∗ -10.51∗∗ -10.52∗∗ -10.53∗∗ -10.50∗∗∗
LM (2) -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01
Sargan (p) 0.333 0.376 0.376 0.335 0.315
Note: Sample size is 9930 observations. Every equation includes constant and industry dummy
variables. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM
using DPD package for GiveWin, one–step results. “Sargan” is a Sargan–Hansen test of overidenti-
fying restrictions (p–value reported). “LM (k) is the test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments
are B/Kt−2 to B/Kt−3, CASH/Kt−3 to CASH/Kt−3, I/Kt−2 to I/Kt−3, and S/Kt−2 to S/Kt−3.
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